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Empirical evidence shows a signi￿cant contrast concerning the choice of ex-
change rate regimes by industrialized and developing countries, with emerg-
ing markets falling somewhat in between. Whereas industrial countries (with
the exception of the member states of the European Union) mostly tend to
have ￿ oating exchange rates, developing and transition countries often choose
￿xed exchange rates, at least de facto if not de jure (Calvo and Reinhart 2002,
Reinhart and Rogo⁄ 2004, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2005). Arguments
explaining this di⁄erence include the lower credibility of the monetary regime,
the shallowness of ￿nancial markets, the openness of the country, and the ex-
istence of a dominant trading partner or a former colonial tie (for a survey of
the arguments, see Rogo⁄ et al. 2004, Meissner and Oomes 2008). Another
dimension in which these countries tend to di⁄er is the amount of corrup-
tion and the quality of institutions and governance.1 Although industrial
countries are not immune to these problems, they are clearly more prevalent
in developing and transition countries as indices developed by Transparency
International (TI 2008) or the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2008) show.
In this paper I aim to explore the connection between institutional quality,
the ￿scal system, and the choice of the exchange rate regime. This connection
is important for countries in which monetary policy is dominated by ￿scal
policy and plays an important role in ￿nancing the public budget (Cukierman
et al. 1992, Crowe 2006, Catao and Terrones 2005), where de-facto indepen-
dence of central banks is often not given (Acemoglu et al. 2008), and where
corruption and rent-seeking are prevalent phenomena that go hand in hand
with high rates of in￿ ation and ambitious government spending (Al-Marhubi
2000, Ades and Di Tella 1999, Blackburn et al. 2008).
The model developed in this paper captures these phenomena and is
hence relevant for countries in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia or the
1Corruption is only one indicator of bad institutions, and indices show a high correlation
of corruption with other indicators of de￿cient institutional quality.
2Caucasus. Many of these countries have considerable amounts of natural
resources such as oil or gas, are plagued by widespread corruption and weak
institutional capacities, and highly distortive and regressive tax systems.
At the same time, monetary policy institutions are not very credible and
for this and other reasons, some of these countries consider forming a mone-
tary union, such as in West Africa (Masson and Pattillo 2005), the Gulf Re-
gion (Sturm and Siegfried 2005), or in the former Soviet Union (Chaplygin
et al. 2006).2 Alternatively, some countries have chosen (or are considering)
a unilateral peg to a low in￿ ation anchor currency or the introduction of
a foreign currency as a means of payment (see Kenen and Meade 2008 for
examples).
The present paper considers the options of monetary autonomy, a hard
peg, or a full monetary union and discusses the implications of a move from
one regime to another for insitutional quality. I ￿nd that a peg to a high
in￿ ation country, or a monetary union with such a country, would lower insti-
tutional quality in the pegging country. This is because the more seigniorage
revenue a country obtains, the less incentive it has to ￿ght against corrup-
tion and looting of the budget. A unilateral peg to a low in￿ ation country
instead would force ￿scal discipline on the pegging country and thus lead the
government to ￿ght harder against corruption. However, lower seigniorage
also implies higher taxes and can have negative output e⁄ects. Governments
thus face a trade-o⁄between higher institutional quality with lower in￿ ation
versus higher taxes with lower output and government spending.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 relates to the literature,
while section 3 develops a theoretical model that analyzes the relation be-
tween ￿scal policy, corruption and in￿ ation. Sections 4-6 look at monetary
independence, a tight peg, and a monetary union respectively. Section 7
concludes.
2There is also discussion about monetary union in Asia or Latin America although
plans are much less advanced there (see Kenen and Meade 2008).
32 The Literature
The paper is related to three issues so far discussed separately in the litera-
ture. One aspect is the connection between ￿scal policy and in￿ ation. A well
established theory considers in￿ ation and seigniorage revenue as an integral
part of an optimal ￿scal policy mix (Phelps 1973, Vegh 1989, or Fischer et
al. 2002 for a survey). Trying to minimize the welfare costs of distortionary
taxation seigniorage is deliberately employed as one source of taxation, in
particular when ￿scal shocks have to be accounted for (Click 1998). While
this theory is a general one, empirical evidence clearly shows that the dom-
inance of monetary policy by ￿scal policy is only relevant for developing
countries and not for industrial or middle income countries (Catao and Ter-
rones 2005). It is particularly relevant for countries with bad insitutions and
low political and social stability (Aisen and Vega 2008).
Clearly, in￿ ation and thus ￿scal policy should have an in￿ uence on the
choice and stability of the exchange rate regime (De Kock and Grilli 1993,
Tornell and Velasco 2000). DeKock and Grilli (1993) in a direct extension of
the arguments above argue that ￿xed exchange rates should collapse when
￿scal shocks hit that require a increase in spending, whereas Tornell and
Velasco (2000) argue that ￿ exible rates impose more ￿scal discipline because
￿xed rates shift the costs of de￿cits into the future and thus induce reckless
￿scal policy.
This literature overlooks a second aspect of ￿scal policy, that is, the ques-
tion of corruption or leakages from ￿scal revenue (for a survey, see Aidt 2003).
In particular many transition economies and developing countries have a fun-
damental problem of corruption a⁄ecting ￿scal revenues, and this, again, is
especially the case for resource rich countries (Ades and Di Tella 1999, Black-
burn et al. 2008, van der Ploeg 2006). A closely related literature discusses
the in￿ uence of interest groups on ￿scal policy, arguing that powerful interest
groups tend to overspend revenues (Lane and Tornell 1996). This e⁄ect arises
because uncoordinated interest groups do not take into account the external
4e⁄ects of their behavior and thus overuse a given resource. Building on that
literature, I ask whether a particular exchange rate regime could induce gov-
ernments to be less tolerant with corruption or other forms of appropriation
of ￿scal resources.
Finally, there exits a voluminous literature on the connection between
monetary policy and institutional quality. This literature, starting with Ro-
go⁄ (1985), usually focuses on the institutional independence of the central
bank or other institutional solutions that lead to a low rate of in￿ ation (see
Cukierman 1992 or Siklos 2002). Again, there is evidence that countries with
low institutional quality, and in particular with corruption and wide spread
rent-seeking, often have a poor monetary policy record (Al-Marhubi 2000).
Most closely related to this paper is recent work by Huang and Wei (2006)
who also explore the connection between institutional quality and monetary
policy but with a di⁄erent focus. They analyze the question of the opti-
mal monetary regime more broadly and include the possibility of appointing
an independent and conservative central banker. Given de￿cits in institu-
tional quality in many of these countries, however, internal solutions, such
as appointing an independent and conservative central banker or moving to
in￿ ation targeting, are not very credible and I therefore focus on external
solutions like a peg or a monetary union.3 In constrast, I conclude that peg-
ging to a stable anchor currency can lead to lower levels of corruption than
monetary autonomy or monetary union.
Another relevant paper, that has a di⁄erent focus but ￿nds evidence
supported by the theory developed here, is Alesina and Wagner (2006). They
are interested in the choice of exchange rate regime per se but incidentally
￿nd a U-shaped relation between corruption and the degree of exchange
rate ￿xity (measured by the Reinhart-Rogo⁄ 2004 index). While countries
3Huang and Wei (2006) rightly argue that many countries lack the capacity for in￿ a-
tion targeting but assume at the same time they are able to credibly create independent
central banks, thus overlooking the di⁄erence between de-facto and de-jure central bank
independence (Cukierman 1992, Siklos 2002, Acemoglu et al. 2008).
5characterized by good institutions tend to have ￿ exible exchange rates the
same is true for countries with very bad institutions. They interpret this
as evidence that countries with good institutions can a⁄ord to have ￿ exible
rates whereas countries with bad institutions need ￿ exible rates. Countries
with intermediate levels of institutional quality tend to have more or less
rigid exchange rates. Alesina and Wagner (2006), however, do not provide a
theory that could explain a causal relationship between these observations.
I develop an explanation focused on seigniorage revenue and in￿ ation that
is consistent with the empirical evidence on ￿scal policy, in￿ ation and bad
institutional quality referred to above.
3 The Model
The model I use is an extension of the models used by Alesina and Tabellini
(1987), De Kock and Grilli (1993), Velasco (1996) or Huang and Wei (2006)
among others. The real economy is re￿ ected in an expectation augmented
Phillips-curve (with slope ￿ < 1), where output can be increased by in￿ ation
above its expected value ￿i > ￿e
i and is lowered by distortive taxation ￿i.4 In
addition, output is a⁄ected by an exogenous supply shock "i with E ["i] = 0
and E ["2
i] = ￿2. All variables are expressed in logarithms. Thus, output in
country i follows
yi = ￿(￿i ￿ ￿
e
i ￿ ￿i) ￿ "i (1)
The budget constraint comprises distortionary taxation and revenue from
in￿ ation (seigniorage) as main sources of revenue. The government bene￿ts,
depending on the exchange rate and monetary system, from seigniorage rev-
enue that is transferred from the central bank to the budget. The contribu-
4Alesina and Tabellini derive the negative in￿ uence of taxation on output from a stan-
dard pro￿t maximization approach of ￿rms. Government spending does not have a (net)
positive in￿ uence on output and is thus unproductive. Again, this assumption applies best
to countries with low institutional quality.
6tion of in￿ ation to the budget is measured as s.5
Extending the standard model, I also assume the government bene￿ts
from some exogenous income stream, ￿i ￿ 0, that might be thought of as
revenue from natural resources, such as oil, gas, diamonds or gold.6 This
allows introducing aspects important for many developing and transition
economies with considerable amounts of natural resources at their disposal.
Tax revenue, to be determined by the government, is ￿i. ￿i measures the
impact of theft, corruption or the institutional quality more broadly on the
budget. Corrupt o¢ cials (or parts of the government) may be bribed into
not collecting all tax obligations by underreporting pro￿ts of ￿rms, they may
steal part of the revenue, or could divert funds for personal purposes and
prestige objects.7 Finally, it could also re￿ ect the access of uncoordinated
interest groups to the budget.
Notice that in contrast to Huang and Wei (2006), I do not assume that
corruption is a share of tax revenue but an absolute sum that can, because of
￿i, even be larger than tax revenue ￿i, since corruption need not only reduce
tax revenue but may in addition divert a part of the exogenous revenue
stream from natural resources into private pockets (Lane and Tornell 1996).
Summarizing, the budget constraint is
gi = ￿i + ￿i ￿ ￿i + s￿i (2)
There are three players: the private sector, the central bank and the
government. The private sector forms rational expectations about the rate
5A fully or nearly fully dollarized economy would thus have s close to zero. In fact, one
could argue that eventually s becomes negative with very high rates of in￿ ation (Fischer
et al. 2001). For simplicity, I assume s constant; not much would change by modelling s
as a declining function of ￿ (Huang and Wei 2006).
6Alternatively, this can be thought of as non-distortionary taxation.
7Corruption is only a shorthand expression for all forms of expropriation of o¢ cial
funds. This can be by the bureaucracy, government ministers, managers of publicly owned
resource extraction industries, or anybody else with access to public funds. See Aidt (2003)
or Blackburn et al. (2008) for an extensive discussion of how corruption leads to revenue
leakages.
7of in￿ ation and is otherwise passive. Government and central bank are two
independent actors. This could either re￿ ect some degree of independence
of the central bank or describe a con￿ ict between di⁄erent entities of the
government, such as between the ministry of ￿nance and the central bank.
All players play Nash against each other, so ￿scal policy, monetary policy,
expectations and anti-corruption measures are all set non-cooperatively. The
timing is: (i) institutional quality (or corruption) is set by the government,
(ii) the private sector forms expectations about in￿ ation and taxes, (iii) the
exogenous shock occurs, (iv) taxes are set, (v) in￿ ation is set, and (vi) output
is realized.
Like it is standard in the literature (Barro and Gordon 1983, Rogo⁄
1985), I assume that the central bank is concerned with avoiding deviations
of in￿ ation from zero and stabilizing output, where the (log of) the natural
level of output is assumed to be zero.8 The degree of conservatism of the






The government is supposed to be under the in￿ uence of several important
interest groups in the economy so that it aims simultaneously at stabilizing
output and in￿ ation, as well as meeting a spending target. The spending
target gi re￿ ects standard political economy arguments about reelection mo-
tives, interest group pressure or simply the absence of alternative instruments
to increase political support (see Brender and Drazen 2005 or Demertzis et al.
2004). In addition the government in concerned with corruption (or leakages
of ￿scal revenue). Changes to the given level of corruption b ￿i are assumed
8Huang and Wei (2006), using Alesina and Tabellini￿ s (1987) approach, assume that the
central bank is also concerned with stabilizing government spending around its target value
which leads to an in￿ ation bias of monetary policy. Since it is not obvious why central
banks should be concerned with spending targets, I use the standard formulation. In
addition, in Huang and Wei￿ s setup with identical utility functions, there is no di⁄erence
between a cooperative and non-cooperative game. My formulation allows for con￿ icts
between policy makers because the government has an additional target.
8to be costly in political terms.9 Increasing corruption might result in protest
from the population, lower foreign investment or less support from inter-
national ￿nancial organizations, like the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. A reduction in corruption, in contrast, leads to personal
income losses for the government or to loss of support from former bene-
￿ciaries of corruption. Thus, I assume that corruption can be reduced by
increasing the control of public servants, by reducing the in￿ uence of interest
groups and rent-seeking, and by creating better institutions like setting up
independent courts or improving public administration. But because of the
personal or political costs of ￿ghting corruption, changes in either direction










i + b(gi ￿ gi)
2 + C (￿i) (4)
Recall that I assume that ￿i is chosen before taxation. Governments,
because they can control corruption to some degree, consider ￿ghting cor-
ruption as an alternative to increasing taxation and thus optimize between
￿ghting corruption and increasing taxation. The di⁄erence is that taxation
is more ￿ exible and can be adjusted in response to shocks.
4 Taxes and Corruption With Independent
Monetary Policy
One possible choice of the government is to choose ￿ exible exchange rates
which allows to set monetary policy independently. Assuming that the cen-
tral bank is independent enough not to be a direct instrument of the gov-
ernment, the two national players choose their optimal policies in a non-
9More precisely, ￿i is the impact of corruption on the budget. For simplicity, I will
speak of the level of corruption in what follows so that b ￿i is the initial level of corruption.
9cooperative game.10
I begin by describing the choice of the central bank. Its optimal policy
follows form minimizing (3) as ￿i = ￿
￿2+c (￿(￿i + ￿e
i) ￿ "i).11 Monetary pol-
icy thus responds to minimize the negative output e⁄ects of taxation, as well
as to expected in￿ ation and economic shocks.
Turning to the policy choices of the government, optimization of (4) with








￿+b with ￿i ￿ gi ￿ ￿i. The two ￿rst-order conditions
show that taxation and corruption are strategic complements. A high tax
revenue leads government to allow more corruption and vice versa.
Solving these equation simultaneously, yields taxation under monetary








c(￿ (￿2 + b) + ￿2b) + ￿2b￿s
￿
￿(c + bs)"i
￿2 (c + bs) + b(￿2 + c)
(5)
Structural taxation is increasing in the di⁄erence between spending tar-
gets and exogenous revenue ￿i and in initial corruption b ￿i. An ambitious
spending target increases taxation (and thus distortions in the real econ-
omy), and so does high corruption. Taxation is falling in the contribution of
seigniorage to the budget, measured by s, and is increasing in c, the central
bank￿ s conservatism because c lowers in￿ ation and seigniorage. Moreover,
since taxation has a negative in￿ uence on output, the government will adjust
taxation in reaction to shocks.
10A con￿ ict between central bank and government does not necessarily imply that the
central bank is fully and credibly independent (see Lohmann 1992).
11Huang and Wei (2006) assume that the central bank is able to commit its monetary
policy so that always ￿ = ￿e. There is thus no credibility gain which is arguably the main
argument for developing countries to peg.




￿b ￿i (c(￿2 + b) + ￿2bs) ￿ ￿2bc￿i
c(￿ (￿2 + b) + ￿2b) + ￿2b￿s
(6)
which is falling in ￿i, meaning that a higher spending target induces more
e⁄orts to ￿ght corruption, and increasing in initial corruption b ￿i. The higher
is the resource revenue ￿i = ￿i￿gi, the more corruption will be allowed, as is
frequently observed in resource rich countries (van der Ploeg 2006, Bornhorst
et al. 2008). ￿
N
i is increasing in s if b ￿i > ￿i, and decreasing in c, re￿ ecting
that central bank independence and good institutional quality are positively
correlated. The more conservative is the central bank the more e⁄orts the
government will undertake to lower corruption and other forms of leakages
because it can expect only little contribution from seigniorage to the budget.
With rational expectation of the private sector, expected in￿ ation is ￿e
i =
￿2








c(￿ (￿2 + b) + ￿2b) + ￿2b￿s
+
￿b"i
￿2 (c + bs) + b(￿2 + c)
(7)
The more in￿ ation averse is the central bank the lower is the reaction
to ￿scal policy and thus in￿ ation.12 At the same time, a more conserva-
tive central bank will stabilize less (Rogo⁄ 1985). Like taxation, in￿ ation is
composed of two parts: a structural part (the ￿rst term) and the reaction
to shocks (second term). In general, in￿ ation and taxation will move into
opposite directions in response to shocks.
12As indicated above, assuming that the central bank is concerned with a spending
target would additionally increase in￿ ation due to the bank￿ s intention to contribute to
￿nancing these expenditures. Here, in￿ ation is increasing in taxation because the central
bank compensates for the negative output e⁄ect of taxes.
115 A Unilateral Exchange Rate Peg
One alternative to independent monetary policy, frequently chosen by de-
veloping and transition countries to solve persistent credibility problems, is
an exchange rate peg (Calvo and Reinhart 2002, Reinhart and Rogo⁄ 2004,
Rogo⁄ et al. 2004). There are many forms of pegs, of course, but I fo-
cus on the subgroup of very hard peg, such as dollarization and currency
boards. Intermediate regimes with limited ￿ exibility provide a combination
of peg and ￿ exible rate and are often chosen by more advanced developing
and transition countries (Frankel 1999). However, intermediate pegs are less
credible than hard pegs, which is particularly relevant for countries plagued
by high levels of corruption and weak institutions (Hinds 2006, Litan and
Steil 2006). The di⁄erence to the case of monetary union, to be considered
in the next section, is that the central bank of the anchor country does not
take developments in the pegging country into account. Hence, in￿ ation is
completely exogenous for the pegging country and there is no reaction of
monetary policy to shocks in this country Instead, the pegging imports the
monetary reaction to shocks in the anchor country.
Denoting in￿ ation in the anchor country as b ￿, the government￿ s choice of
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￿ (￿2 + b)b ￿i ￿ ￿2b(￿i ￿ sb ￿)
￿ (￿2 + b) + ￿2b
(9)
For all practical purposes, it can be assumed that in￿ ation in the anchor
country is so low that the contribution of seigniorage to the budget at this rate
of in￿ ation is negligible. I therefore set b ￿ = ￿P
i = 0 in what follows.13 This
13This may of course be di⁄erent for a country that unilaterally pegs to another de-
veloping or transition country. Since most pegs are to the dollar or the euro, however, I
12implies that I cannot distinguish between a very tight peg, such as a currency
board, and full dollarization. While the former, in principle, implies at least
some seigniorage revenue as long as the anchor currency￿ s rate of in￿ ation is
positive, this is not the case with dollarization.14
Comparing monetary autonomy and pegging (see Appendix B), the fol-
lowing proposition can be established:
Proposition 1 Under a unilateral hard peg more taxation, lower output,
lower in￿ation, lower spending, and lower corruption can be expected than
under monetary autonomy. Since economic shocks can no longer be stabilized,
taxtation, output, and government spending become more volatile.
Because the government loses seigniorage the budget constraint becomes
harder, forcing the government to look for alternative sources of ￿nance and
to lower overall spending. There are two sources to make up for the loss of
seigniorage, taxation and ￿ghting corruption. Because of increasing marginal
costs both are used. Due to the higher rate of taxation, output will be lower
on average and more variable because monetary policy does not stabilize.
Since there is no seigniorage under the peg, government spending will be
lower as well. Finally, taxation must become more ￿ exible and if ￿2 > bs
taxation will react stronger in response to shocks than under autonomy.
6 Monetary Union
The case of a monetary union is more complicated. I assume there are two
countries in the monetary union with relative share zi so that z1 + z2 = 1.15
neglect this case.
14The advantage of full dollarization instead might be that interest rates are lower
because reneging on the peg is less likely. Since there is no role for interest rates in my
model, this e⁄ect is neglected here.
15One may also assume a union of n countries with z1 = 1




average of all other countries in the union.
13Since I am interested in the situation of the individual country, which is likely
to be rather small in comparison to the rest of the monetary union, I focus on
country 1 and assume z2 > z1. This re￿ ects, for instance, a monetary union
between a large and a small country, such as discussed between Russia and
individual CIS countries, or the case of a single country joining an existing
monetary union. As Chaplygin et al. (2006) argue it is even possible that
z1 = 0 and that the smaller country plays no role in determining monetary
policy. The di⁄erence to a unilateral peg, however, is that some seigniorage
revenue is distributed to the country. I assume that the share of each country
in overall seigniorage corresponds to its relative economic size zi.
In a Nash-game with symmetric countries it is obvious that the policy
choices of a single country are equal to the average and vice versa. Thus, the
comparison is only interesting if countries diverge in some characteristics. In
order to focus on economic di⁄erences, I assume ￿1 7 ￿2 and b ￿1 7 b ￿2 while
all utility parameters are equal across countries. (It is rather trivial to derive
economic consequences of di⁄erent preferences. Moreover, higher or lower
preferences for corruption lead to the same e⁄ect as a higher initial level of
corruption.)




2 + b(z1y1 + z2y2)
2 (10)
where I assume that in￿ ation is equal across the monetary union.16 The
common central bank is concerned with minimizing common in￿ ation and
stabilizing average output in the union. The ￿rst order condition with respect
16For simplicity I assume a common rate of in￿ ation. Because of transmission asym-
metries or the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect in￿ ation rates can di⁄er between countries. Since
these di⁄erences are indepedent from monetary policy, however, I neglect them. Economi-
cally, the absence of structural di⁄erences in in￿ ation supposes countries which are roughly
equally developed.






e + z1￿1 + z2￿2) +
￿
￿2 + c
(z1"1 + z2"2) (11)
Thus, the only di⁄erence between the reaction of the national central bank
and the union￿ s central bank is that the latter takes developments in both
countries into account and weighs each country with its relative economic
weight zi. Since I abstract from structural di⁄erences in the rate of in￿ ation,
expected in￿ ation is equal in both economies. For simplicity, I further assume
that national shocks are uncorrelated and independent.
As Appendix A demonstrates, as before taxation is increasing in the struc-
tural spending gap and initial corruption in a country. However, it is falling in
the spending gap and corruption in the other countries while the strength of
this reaction depends on the relative size of that country z2. This is because
these in￿ uences give rise to higher in￿ ation and thus increase seigniorage.
Moreover, as before the country lowers taxation in response to an exoge-
nous shock. Since the central bank will also react to this shock, there are two
opposing e⁄ects. If the output e⁄ect of in￿ ation is large, government can let
taxation increase because its negative output consequences are compensated
by in￿ ation. Taxation falls, however, if seigniorage is increasing su¢ ciently
as a consequence of monetary expansion. Hence, it matters whether ￿2 > bs.
Corruption is increasing in the initial level and decreasing in the spending
gap, like in the case of monetary independence. It is additionally increasing
in seigniorage revenue which in turn is a function of spending gaps and initial
corruption in both countries. Hence, corruption levels in member countries
are complements. Because corruption is determined before shocks, it is in-
dependent from shocks and time invariant.
As argued in the introduction, there are at least two possibilities to move
to a monetary union. Countries can jump directly from monetary autonomy
to a union or have a peg to another currency before they join a union. I
consider both cases in turn.
15Comparing ￿rst the results for monetary union with the results under
monetary autonomy leads to the following proposition (see Appendix B):
Proposition 2 Moving from autonomy to an asymmetric monetary union,
corruption will increase if ￿2 + b ￿2 > ￿1 + b ￿1. Moreover, it can be expected
that taxes will decrease, that output will increase (because taxation is lowered),
and that in￿ation and spending (because of higher seigniorage) will increase.
If ￿2 > bs and "1 > "2, there is less stabilization through monetary policy in
the monetary union and more stabilization of shocks through taxes.
Monetary union will not necessarily have bene￿cial structural e⁄ects for
all countries. If the other member country brings a large ￿nance gap and a
high degree of corruption into the monetary union, in￿ ation set by the com-
mon central bank will be relatively high. Thus, seigniorage will be higher for
the home country than before which induces the government to let corruption
increase and to lower domestic taxation. This negative e⁄ect from monetary
union is, of course, increasing in the relative weight of the partner country
z2. There is hence a convergence between countries; countries with a high
initial level of distortions will lose seigniorage and thus lower corruption and
spending and vice versa.
As compared to stabilization of shocks through monetary policy and tax-
ation, it is clear that taxes stabilize less if monetary policy stabilizes more.
If "1 > "2 the common central bank reacts less strongly to shocks in the
home country than the national central bank before monetary union, forcing
domestic taxation into this role. Moreover, ￿2 > bs implies that monetary
policy is predominantly used to stabilize shocks (in comparison to being used
to ￿nance government spending). This implies that under monetary auton-
omy this instrument has been used relatively strongly. Hence, both aspects
together imply that there is less stabilization through monetary policy than
under monetary autonomy.
Comparing instead the tight peg to the monetary union yields the follow-
ing results (see Appendix B):
16Proposition 3 If a country moves from a tight peg to an asymmetric mone-
tary union with a more distorted partner country ￿2+b ￿2 > ￿1+b ￿1, corruption
will increase. In addition, on average taxes will decrease, whereas in￿ation,
the level of spending, and the level of output will increase. The response of
taxes to shocks is lower under monetary union if ￿2 > bs while that of mon-
etary policy increases. Output and government spending are more variable
under the peg.
Since by de￿nition the peg is accompanied by zero in￿ ation and no
seigniorage, it is clear that in￿ ation increases in the monetary union, while
taxation will decrease. Due to higher seigniorage revenue, the government
will allow corruption and government spending to increase. Because of lower
taxation output will also increase. Thus, countries that are considering mov-
ing from a unilateral peg to an asymmetric monetary union with distorted
countries risk seeing their institutional qualities deteriorate. Moreover, since
monetary policy cannot react to shocks under the peg, taxes will have to be
used for stabilization of shocks, leading to more volatile output and spending.
7 Conclusion
The paper has analyzed a relatively little researched dimension of institu-
tional quality and monetary policy. While the existence of independent and
conservative central banks has often been explored in comparison to external
anchors for monetary policy, the in￿ uence of ￿scal policy and corruption and
rent-seeking is under-explored. I develop a model that explicitly considers
the connection between ￿scal policy and monetary policy if corruption and
other leakages from ￿scal revenue are important. It is shown that a tight peg
to a low in￿ ation currency can improve the institutional quality in a country.
The government is induced to ￿ght more strongly against leakages and cor-
ruption if the revenue from seigniorage is lowered. This, unfortunately, also
leads to higher taxation and thus higher output distortions. Governments
17thus face a trade-o⁄between higher revenue, output and spending and lower
in￿ ation and corruption when choosing their exchange rate regime. The ef-
fects of changes in taxation and corruption on government utility are thus
not obvious and will depend on the relative weights a government assigns to
these opposing in￿ uences. Which of the regimes is preferred by a government
mainly depends on the initial level of distortions and corruption and the rel-
ative preference for reducing in￿ ation, stabilizing output and expenditures,
and ￿ghting corruption.
Concerning the stabilizing role of monetary policy it is clear that a hard
peg implies the least stabilization whereas in a monetary union member coun-
tries import monetary reactions to shocks in partner countries (according to
their relative weights). The loss of monetary policy implies that ￿scal policy
will have to assume a stronger role in stabilization which implies a higher
volatility of taxes and output. This as well can be considered a disadvantage
of giving up monetary autonomy.
Moving to a full monetary union can lead to more or less corruption,
depending mainly on the choice of partner countries for the monetary union.
Countries with di⁄erent levels of corruption and spending targets for ￿scal
policy will experience a convergence in corruption and spending. Thus, lower
corruption will only result if the country joins a monetary union where is has
a relatively little weight and where the other countries have relatively well
developed institutions.
These results, although not tested directly in this paper, are supported
by the evidence in other studies. There is a strong correlation between cor-
ruption and ￿scal problems, and also between in￿ ation and corruption, thus
supporting the view that seigniorage plays an important role in developing
and middle income countries. It is also well established in the literature that
with access to "easy" ￿scal revenues governments have lower incentives to
￿ght against corruption. Moreover, it is clear that high rates of in￿ ation
are ultimately not compatible with ￿xed rates. Thus, ￿xed rates are nei-
18ther compatible with weak institutions and corruption as these imply higher
in￿ ation.
These results have obvious implications for countries in a high corrup-
tion environment, such as in Africa or the CIS states. Since some of these
countries are considering one or the other form of monetary integration with
dominant neighbors, the results derived here suggest being careful. It might
be better in some cases to (continue to) peg to currencies like the US-dollar
or the euro instead of moving to a regional monetary union. These ￿ndings
also cast doubt on the now nearly universal advice by international agencies
like the International Monetary Fund that countries choose ￿ exible exchange
rate regimes. Such a solution may actually be accompanied by a deterio-
ration of institutional quality which is also one of the aims of international
organizations. It should be taken into consideration that these aims need not
necessarily go together well.
Appendix
Appendix A: Taxes and Corruption in Monetary Union
Taking the ￿rst order conditions for the government from (4), using the rate
of in￿ ation (11), imposing rational expectations, and solving simultaneously
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Appendix B: Comparison of Monetary Regimes
When comparing results under di⁄erent regimes, two e⁄ects have to separated
for in￿ ation and taxation. Because both also respond to shocks, optimal
policy can be separated into a structural e⁄ect (corresponding to expected
values) and the response to shocks. I will thus separate comparisons into a
structural part and a part capturing the response to economic shocks.

















































Moreover, one can rewrite government spending and output as functions












































, where k refers to the monetary regime, k = N;P;M.
National Autonomy (N) vs. Peg (P)





hold. Turning to taxation, one ￿nds that structural (or expected) taxation










by using (5) and
(8). Therefore, expected output will decrease while government spending




￿2(c+bs)+b(￿2+c) which is the case if ￿2 > bs. This is because there
is no monetary support to deal with the shock under the peg. In￿ ation
under autonomy will be higher by de￿nition and so will be the response to
the shock. Because of the higher rate of taxation, average output will be
lower and become more volatile. Since there is no seigniorage under the peg,
government spending will be lower as well.
National Autonomy (N) vs. Monetary Union (M)

























if and only if ￿2 +b ￿2 > ￿1 +b ￿1. In this case,
expected output and spending will increase because in￿ ation increases and
taxation falls under monetary union.
Moreover, there will be less stabiliaztion of shocks through in￿ ation and
thus necessarily more stabilization through taxation under monetary union
if "1 > "2 and ￿2 > bs.
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￿2+b. Taxation will directly respond to the shock by the same amount
￿"1
￿2+b











structural taxation will be higher under a peg. As before, because taxes are
higher under the peg output falls and becomes more variable. Likewise, aver-
age government spending is higher under monetary union due to seigniorage
revenue.
The response of taxes to shocks is muted under monetary union if ￿2 > bs
because in this case the government lets monetary policy respond of the shock
and stabilizes less through taxation.
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